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Abstract 
This paper considers one theme in the contemporary legacy of Potter and Wetherell’s 
(1987) Discourse and Social Psychology.  It overviews the context that led to that book and 
considers a series of critical responses from both experimental and critical/qualitative social 
psychologists.  It refutes criticisms and corrects confusions.  Focusing on contemporary 
discursive psychology, it highlights (a) its rigorous use of records of actual behaviour; (b) its 
systematic focus on normative practices.  In methodological terms it (a) highlights 
limitations in the use of open ended interviews; (b) considers the way naturalistic materials 
provide access to participants’ own orientations and displays; (c) builds a distinctive logic of 
sampling and generalization.  In theoretical terms it (a) highlights the way discourse work 
can identify foundational psychological matters; (b) offers a novel approach to emotion and 
embodiment; (c) starts to build a matrix of dimensions which are central to the building and 
recognizing of different kinds of social actions.  It now offers a fully formed alternative social 
psychology which coordinates theory and method and a growing body of empirical work.
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THE CONTEXT OF DISCOURSE AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
In the early 1980s while the ideas that were formed into Discourse and Social 
Psychology (Potter & Wetherell, 1987) were being developed, social psychology in both the 
UK and North America was overwhelmingly based on experimental or questionnaire studies, 
most of them conducted on college students.  At that time there were very few general 
texts on ‘qualitative methods’ in social science generally, and none in psychology.  There 
was no use of open ended interviews in psychology – although they were being used in 
ethnographic work in sociology and anthropology.  There was no research using direct 
naturalistic records of interaction, although the use of indirect observational methods had 
been haltingly explored (Barker, 1968; Webb et al., 1966).   
A so-called ‘crisis in social psychology’ had smouldered through the 1970s.  In North 
America the crisis focused on method and particularly the damaging role of ‘demand 
characteristics’, ‘experimenter effects’, the limited ‘external validity’ of laboratory 
experiments, and the difficulty of separating experimental findings from historical and 
cultural contexts (e.g. Elms, 1975; Gergen, 1973; McGuire, 1973).  Self styled ‘European 
social psychology’ supplemented these problems by highlighting the individualism of much 
social psychological research, its failure to adequately fit social psychological analysis to a 
broader social and political analysis, and its inadequate notions of causality (e.g. Harré & 
Secord, 1972; Israel & Tajfel, 1972; Shotter, 1977).  The diagnosis and critique was in many 
ways brilliant and generated much debate.  Yet it did not offer a fully realised research 
alternative to traditional approaches to social psychology.  Rom Harré’s (1979) ‘ethogenic’ 
perspective came closest to this, but did not build a sustained body of research studies.   
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The success of Discourse and Social Psychology is at least partly due to its provision of a 
novel vision of how research might be done.   
It was influenced by post-structuralist thinking (particularly the work of Roland 
Barthes and Michel Foucault).  Such work had been earlier introduced into British 
psychology via the short lived journal Ideology and Consciousness in the late 1970s and 
developed into a full perspective in the Changing the Subject (Henriques, et al., 1984/1998). 
The engagement of Discourse and Social Psychology with post-structuralism, however, came 
out of separate exploration which compared literary and social psychological constructions 
of human action (Potter, Stringer & Wetherell, 1984).  Post-structuralism offered tools for 
understanding the way language and meaning operated in social practices, and in particular 
the complex constructive business done by ostensively straight descriptions, and it 
continues to be central in more ideological streams of discourse work (Wetherell, 1998, in 
press).   
At least as important as post-structuralism was an engagement with conversation 
analysis, ethnomethodology and linguistic philosophy (Coulter, 1979) and the sociology of 
scientific knowledge (itself stimulated by radical developments in philosophy of science 
derived from Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend).  Indeed, the version of discourse analysis 
drawn on in Discourse and Social Psychology did not come from linguistics (where there 
were already at least two analytic approaches called discourse analysis) but from Nigel 
Gilbert and Michael Mulkay’s discourse analytic approach to the sociology of scientific 
knowledge (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984 – see Mulkay, Potter & Yearley, 1983, for an early 
statement).  This introduced the notion of an ‘interpretative repertoire’ to describe the 
different kinds of accounts that scientists offered when they were justifying their own 
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claims and explaining away the claims of competitors.  A refined version of this became a 
central analytic tool in Discourse and Social Psychology.   
Although Discourse and Social Psychology engaged with theory, meta-theory and 
philosophy, it was distinctive in building its argument for a new way of doing social 
psychology on detailed, concrete analysis of actual discourse.  As we will see, this distinctive, 
empirically driven, element in discourse analysis has sometimes been missed by critics 
working within social psychology who have focused on its constructionist or anti-
foundationalist themes and have not appreciated how far this constructionism was married 
with careful empirical work on texts and talk (Potter, 1996).  Some of chapters worked with 
open ended interviews, others primarily reworked analyses of real-life materials from 
everyday or institutional settings.  Conversation analytic work was drawn heavily on for the 
analysis of mundane telephone calls, police interrogations and courtroom interaction; all  
records of interaction that would now be called ‘naturalistic materials’.  The natural is to 
mark the contrast from the ‘got up’ materials that have been at the centre of social 
psychology’s development in North America and much of Europe – vignettes, experimental 
protocols, survey responses – while natural is qualified as naturalistic to highlight a 
sophisticated awareness of the potential for researcher involvement in such material 
(Potter, 2002, in press). 
Discourse and Social Psychology offered a complete approach to social psychological 
matters.  It took the chapter headings of the textbooks of the time – attitudes, categories 
and so on – and developed alternative analyses that often completely rebuilt the original 
notions.  The aim of this paper is to offer something of an audit of the coherence and 
success of one major strand of discursive psychology after more than a quarter of a century.  
A full description of the different strands of this work is beyond the scope of this paper, let 
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alone a full evaluation.  Part of the problem here is that discourse work has been evolving 
with different emphases and as parts of different debates over this quarter century, and the 
different critical responses have a range of specific targets.  Inevitably this audit of 
arguments and issues will engage in considerable simplification. 
In simple terms, Discourse and Social Psychology had a major impact across the 
social and human sciences – more than four thousand citations in more than two hundred 
and fifty different journals.  This impact has gradually built up such that in 2011 the annual 
rate of citation in journals, books and chapters is more than five hundred a year.  It helped 
establish some form of discourse analysis as a component of social psychology and social 
sciences more generally, it offered new ways of working with open-ended interviews, and it 
helped establish the legitimacy of using qualitative methods in psychology.  Nevertheless its 
coverage in North America and APA journals is limited.  By adopting a story of science as 
only conducted through experiments, these journals have effectively operated a closed shop 
against  radical alternatives or debates.  Despite the more sophisticated understanding of 
the history and philosophy of science that is widely available the system has remained 
closed; there is an important argument to be had. 
The rest of this paper will consider a series of topics.  These are mostly organized 
around problems with common criticisms of discourse work.   It will outline current thinking, 
respond to criticisms and, where necessary, indicate limitations in the original work.  The 
aim will be to offer a set of observations that mesh together to provide a complete picture 
of a discursive social psychology that can provide an alternative to both traditional and 
critical contemporary perspectives.   
These debates are organized around two very different visions of human conduct 
and its study.  The majority of contemporary approaches treat human conduct as ultimately 
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dependent on putative individual entities such as beliefs, attitudes and knowledge.  
Approaches as varied as social cognition (Fiske & Taylor, 2008) and interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (Smith & Osborne, 1998) have adopted some version of this 
cognitivism.  Discourse psychologists start with practices; that is, people interacting with 
one another, in mundane and institutional settings; and they bracket off issues of cognition.  
It is not that discursive psychologists do not consider thinking, cognition, mind, feelings and 
so on, but this is not something they start with and they see as the causal underpinning of 
social behaviour.  Rather these things become a major topic of analysis in terms of the 
orientations and constructions of participants. 
 
SCIENCE 
 
Anthony Manstead’s (2008) authoritative chapter on methods of social psychology 
engages, briefly but consequentially, with discourse work to justify not including it in the 
book.  It is a useful start point because it makes explicit arguments that have been 
expressed in other publications and more informally expressed in talks and conferences.  It 
captures what might be called the mainstream response to discourse work.  It provides a set 
of reasons why this large body of work should be excluded from social psychology.  It is a 
condensed piece of academic gatekeeping.  Given this consequence it will be worth 
considering the logic and rationale for this exclusion carefully.   
Manstead spends a paragraph overviewing one of the first discourse analytic 
publications in the BJSP (Wetherell, Stiven & Potter, 1987) and then writes: 
 
Rereading Discourse and Social Psychology 
 
 
8 | P a g e  
 
This sort of qualitative approach is not represented in the present volume, where the 
emphasis is on the strengths of a realist, quantifiable social psychology.  This is not to say 
that qualitative methods play no role in the research that is represented in this book.  It is 
more that, as noted above, qualitative methods are used in the early stages of such research, 
rather than being the sole research method.  The role played by qualitative research methods 
in social psychology largely reflects differences in philosophical belief about the causation of 
social behaviour.  For realist social psychologists, social behaviour has causes, and the goal 
of research is to shed light on those causes.  For many qualitative researchers, social 
behaviour does not have causes in the same way that, say, an earthquake has causes.  Such 
researchers use qualitative research methods to identify how people construct their own an 
others’ behaviours.  From the standpoint of the research represented in the present volume, 
qualitative research seems to be more focused on description than explanation, and more 
concerned with how behaviour is constructed than how it is caused (Manstead, 2008).   
 
Two initial observations: first, this quote combines large bodies of work together using the 
conventional yet problematic distinction between quantitative and qualitative research.  
From the perspective of contemporary discourse work numbers are not the issue (discursive 
psychology and, indeed, contemporary conversation analysis is increasingly using 
quantification of different kinds).  As noted above, a more relevant distinction is between 
work that presupposed some form of cognitivism and work that does not (Edwards & 
Potter, 2005).  In the quote above, using a cognitivist metatheory comes close to being 
equated with doing science itself – this is a form of rhetorical gerrymandering that will need 
unpacking.   
Second, it builds a picture of qualitative research as something focused primarily on 
description rather than explanation, and therefore something that should be done as a 
preliminary phase in research before it matures to full quantification.  More on this below, 
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but just note that although this idea of the qualitative preliminary to mature work is a 
regular trope in the history of social psychology, but it is far from clear that experimental 
studies do start with such a phase of work, and if they did what its systematic basis would 
be, how it would be related to the experimental protocols used,  and so on. For example, in 
reviewing experimental social psychological work on threats Jonathan Potter and Alexa 
Hepburn (2011a) found no evidence of descriptive phase of work; the conceptualization of 
threats was truncated and presumptive.  It is hard to escape the view that the idea of a 
preliminary qualitative phase to quantitative research is more rhetorical than genuine.  a  
For researchers who have done considerable descriptive work and have come to recognize 
the difficulty and subtlety involved in collecting material, developing appropriate analytic 
categories, and managing it systematically, the idea that there is a regular early phase in 
experimental work that is nevertheless invisible in the published literature is simply not 
credible.  Long before Discourse and Social Psychology was published Henri Tajfel (1972) 
bemoaned the prevalence of ‘experiments in a vacuum’; the contemporary failure to embed 
experimental work in careful descriptive studies is surely more of the same. 
 
I – Observation and empiricism 
Discourse and Social Psychology was partly a sketch of a different kind of 
observational, empirical science of human social life.  It had a sophisticated take on what it 
was to make observations, based in the critique of simple empiricism developed in different 
ways by Imre Lakatos, Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper (see Godfrey-Smith, 2003).  But at its 
centre was systematic focus on the organization of participants’ discourse.  Such 
observation threw up findings that immediately sat in contrast with standard social 
psychological assumptions.  For example, if you looked carefully at the talk of individuals 
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they would move between a range different evaluative positions on a particular object.  As 
Chapter Two of Discourse and Social Psychology demonstrated, the variability inevitably 
thrown up by the practical and situated nature of evaluative actions was mostly ironed out 
by the operational procedures of attitude scales and the way they are statistically processed 
(Potter, 1998).  However carefully you search the literature that satisfies Manstead’s 
criterion of scientific social psychology you will not find careful descriptive work on the way 
attitudes appear in everyday settings. 
In Karin Knorr-Cetina’s (1999) study of the work of high energy physicists with at 
CERN she found something striking about the way they divided their time.  The physicists 
spent more time describing and understanding the operation of the particle detector than 
they spent in full research operations aimed at identifying particles and testing theories.  
The reason for this is simple; the physicists were not sure what they were how to interpret 
the trails and numbers without a very full understanding of the detector and its vicissitudes.   
There is a telling comparison here with social psychology.  In the research literature 
on social psychology there is very little analytically grounded discussion of how social 
psychology experiments work.  This may be because experimental social psychologists 
believe that their participant experience of experiments gives them sufficient access such 
that no better understanding is needed.  However, that is not their characteristic stance on 
other areas of social life.  Moreover, being able to take part in a culture is quite different 
from being able to describe it in a way that communicates precisely to others in a way that 
explicates its operation.  It may be that social psychologists simply do not have the 
systematic theoretical and analytic apparatus for studying a complex, unfolding social 
institution such as a social psychology experiment.  If that is the case, then that is something 
that might give them pause for thought.  Finally, it may suit social psychologists to not have 
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such an interest as there is so much invested in the success of the experiment as a tool for 
social psychology research.  If it is experiments that are the key bastion against the 
encroachment of discourse researchers then it might be safer not to ask uncomfortable 
questions.   
In this context, it is interesting to look at descriptions of how the crisis was resolved 
(see Manstead, 2008, pp. 14-16).  It is surely time for a collaboration between an 
experimental social psychologist, a discursive psychologist and a sociologist of science in 
studying how a social psychology experiment is conceived, performed, analysed, and 
reported.  This might bring experimental social psychologists a little closer to high energy 
physicists. 
It is important to stress that the situation is no better for qualitative social 
psychology in traditions such as social representations or interpretative phenomenological 
analysis.  There is a tiny metaliterature on the open ended research interview.  Given that 
the interview is the principal means through which much qualitative research generates its 
data it is clearly equally deserving of a systematic research study.  Indeed, discursive 
psychologists have initiated such a study  – more on this below. 
 
II – Experiments and causality 
In Manstead’s (2008) gatekeeping statement he makes a contrast between a 
concern with how behaviour is constructed and a concern with how it is caused.  This might 
seem a clear epistemic distinction.  Scientists can enter here; constructionists and literary 
critics have their own nicely decorated clubs further down the street.  However, this 
perpetrates a number of confusions about discourse work and depends on a problematic 
picture of science.  In particular, it blurs together the anti-foundationalist meta-theory most 
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controversially developed in Death and Furniture (Edwards, Ashmore & Potter, 1995) with 
the kinds of insights in Discourse and Social Psychology and later Wetherell and Potter 
(1992) about the role of descriptions in the management of racist critique.  Death and 
Furniture was not a foppish manifesto for a world without foundations; it was a contribution 
to epistemic thinking that drew on sociology of scientific knowledge and discursive 
psychology to highlight a generic epistemic predicament of research in physics, social 
psychology of all kinds, legal cases, police interrogations and relationship disputes.  One can 
argue against the position (e.g. see Elder Vass, in press), but it is a mistake to see it as 
reflecting a research choice that can simply be made differently.  Discursive psychologists 
haven not voted for an anti-foundationalist epistemology; rather, they have arrived at such 
a position through conceptual and historical analysis.  Moreover, the anti-foundationalism is 
not relevant to much of its basic analytic practice.  Like scientists of all kind there is a 
concern with rigour, clarity, the quality of empirical data, the systematic basis of analysis 
and so on.  There is virtually no reference to constructionism in Discourse and Social 
Psychology.  Ken Gergen’s (1985) treatise on social constructionism had been published, and 
this referred back to Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s (1966) classic, but the breadth 
and complexity of constructionist thinking was not yet apparent (see papers in Holstein and 
Gubrium, 2008).  Potter (1996) was partly an attempt to clarify what it is at stake.  It wrests 
constructionism from Berger and Luckmann’s cognitivist picture and avoids the emphasis on 
narrative that is central to Gergen’s work (e.g. Gergen, 2009; for the arguments that urge 
caution about the notion of narrative see Edwards, 1997, ch. 10); instead, it focuses on the 
careful empirical study of how descriptions are formed to produce and manage particular 
actions (blaming, accounts, attacks and so on).  Construction is here something concrete 
and analytically tractable in line with the programmatic emphasis of Discourse and Social 
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Psychology.  For example, Derek Edwards and Jonathan Potter’s (1993) engagement with 
attribution theory highlighted the central role of descriptions in forming attributions, and 
showed how this is available for systematic, public, reproducible study.   
Manstead’s (2008) contrasts construction with causation.  Causation sounds like a 
golden ticket for membership of the scientific social psychology club.  However, it dissolves 
under careful scrutiny.  First, controlled experiments are certainly claimed to identify effects 
beyond mere associations.  Yet, such effects can be a consequence of conceptual 
relationships; the separation out of variables does not establish the precise mechanism of 
the operation of those variables.  The figuration of the term ‘effect’ suggests a mechanical 
impulsion but a significant ‘effect’ found using a test such as an ANOVA does not prove 
anything so mechanical.   For example, if studies show that social influence is a consequence 
of information that is treated as reliable, that does not specify precisely how information is 
involved in changes in conduct.  The relentless focus on experimental relationships divorced 
from any serious study of interactional process or conduct encourages a billiard ball vision 
of causation (an argument that Rom Harré made effectively and repeatedly; e.g. Harré 
1979).  However, the identification of relationships in experiments surely raises the question 
of what makes them come about.  A cognitivist answer to this question will lead to further 
focus on processing and then on to social neuroscience.  Yet that fails to consider the 
normative order of interaction within which conduct (‘behaviour’) is situated.  Discursive 
psychology highlights the central role of that order.  Note again the discourse critique of the 
well known Language Category Model of attribution (Edwards & Potter, 1993).  Edwards and 
Potter highlight precisely some of the ways that the statistical analysis is confounded by and 
dependent on conceptual relations.  The broader point, however, is that causality (however 
understood) is not the sine qua non of a scientific approach.  Rather we can look to 
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observation, rigour, system and prediction – things that are characteristic of contemporary 
discursive psychology. 
Human action is contingent and voluntary.  This need not be a philosophical point 
but reflects the normative organization of interaction which is a central and analytically 
tractable topic of discursive work and conversation analysis (Potter & Edwards, in press; 
Schegloff, 2007).  For example, requests are conventional and necessarily highly 
recognizable forms of action.  If they cannot be recognized they will not work as requests.  
They do not, however, cause what happens next in the way wind might cause a tree to 
bend.  A request sets up at least two contrasting alternatives for the recipient – granting and 
rejecting.  These options are systematically provided for in the design of the request and 
typically ordered such that acceptances are ‘preferred’, and therefore done differently, to 
declinations.  Indeed, requests can be designed to display increasing levels of entitlement 
over the actions of another and to orient to different levels of contingency of the recipient 
being able to grant the request (Curl & Drew, 2008).  This intricate social order is analysable 
in its detail and such analyses are repeatable and open to public scrutiny.   
The general point here is that statistical relationships, even highly significant ones 
derived from experiments, need to be treated cautiously when considering what is implied 
by causality.  Crucially, contingent relationships within action sequences are open to 
systematic analysis.  Moreover, as Manstead notes when responding to the kinds of critical 
points raised in the ‘crisis in social psychology’, statistically significant effects may be very 
small.  Discursive psychological work can identify clear and regular patterns, which can 
sometimes be in direct conflict with the claims of experimental work (see, e.g. Schmid & 
Feidler, 1999; Edwards & Potter, 1999).  Ruling discourse work out on the basis of not 
studying ‘causality’ is surely based on a limited view of the processes that are amenable to 
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scientific study and mixing together what is shown by a statistical experimental finding and 
the figuration of billiard balls and mechanical processes (Harré, 1989). 
 
METHOD 
 
The points above are intended to counter some of the arguments against discourse 
work being treated as a part of a broader tradition of empirical social psychology because of 
its flawed scientific status.  The points below are intended to highlight the methodological 
coherence of a programme of discursive psychology.  Again they are organized partly in 
relation to familiar and repeated critiques. 
 
I – Interviews 
One of the features of Discourse and Social Psychology was its introduction of a new 
way of working with open ended interviews.  It suggested that interviews might be more 
effective if they were more engaged and even confrontative rather than trying to chase an 
impossible ideal of neutrality.  Such engagement might bring into the open the varied 
interpretative resources (‘interpretative repertoires’) drawn on by participants.  Rather than 
simply interviewing participants about their lives or beliefs the interview was intended to 
become an arena of ideological engagement where the different resources participants had 
available to manage ideological trouble could be identified and described.  Such work with 
interviews is laborious, involving careful attention to the detail of constructions in the talk of 
both interviewer and interviewee.  It emphasised that both parties would be drawing on 
ideologically live resources and the interviewees talk would need to be analysed in the 
context of analysis of the talk of the interviewer.  The interview was conceived as an 
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interactional laboratory for driving ideological resources out into the open and laying bare 
their organization rather than a pathway to the participants’ past actions, experiences or 
opinions.  This way of working with interviews was central to Wetherell and Potter (1992) 
and they have been used in similar effective ways by, for example, Billig (1992) and 
Augoustinos, Tuffin and Rapley (1999).  For example, Tileagă’s (2005, 2009, 2011) important 
work on remembering, history and commemoration works with interviews and texts such as 
letters.   
Since 1987 interviews (and sometimes focus groups) have become the default data 
generation method for a wide range of qualitative researchers from different perspectives 
in social psychology (e.g. ethnography, interpretative phenomenological analysis, narrative 
psychology, grounded theory, and psychoanalysis).  Discourse and Social Psychology 
undoubtedly played its part in this proliferation.  Yet as Knorr-Cetina’s (1999) work showed, 
in other sciences there is a strong, careful reflexive attention to the operation of the 
machineries for data generation.  This has been notably lacking with respect to interviews in 
social science generally and social psychology in particular.  Open ended interviews present 
many dangerous opportunities for conducting poorly analysed research backed by 
illustrative quotes shorn of their interactional context (Antaki, et al., 2003; Silverman, 2011). 
For some time, work in conversation analysis has focused on explicating the 
organization of questions and answers in a range of different institutional settings, including 
news interviews (e.g. Clayman & Heritage, 2002), court rooms (e.g. Atkinson & Drew, 1979), 
police interrogations (e.g. Stokoe & Edwards, 2010), psychological assessment interviews 
(Antaki & Rapley, 1996) and focus groups (Puchta & Potter, 2002) as well as in mundane 
settings such as everyday phone calls and family mealtimes (Heritage & Raymond, in press; 
Stivers & Hayashi, 2010).  This work highlights the extraordinary delicacy and complexity of 
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questioning as a practice and the way it can embody preferences, manage neutralism, 
establish presuppositions and build a range of constraints that the recipient must manage 
(e.g. Raymond, 2003).  On the one hand, this body of work highlights the bluntness of 
traditional notions of ‘bias’ and ‘leading questions’ in the social science methods literature.  
On the other, it highlights and describes the powerful role of the interviewer’s questions in 
generating particular kinds of responses.  The implications of these and other problems for 
qualitative work in psychology and the social sciences more broadly are profound and have 
been developed elsewhere (Edwards & Stokoe, 2004; Potter & Hepburn, 2005a,b, 2007, in 
press; Stokoe, 2011). They provide an important motive for discursive psychologists focusing 
on naturalistic materials.  Ironically, although interviews were often lauded by ‘qualitative 
researchers’ as an advance over questionnaires they are in many ways similar machineries 
guided by the agenda of the researcher (Attenborough & Stokoe, 2012). 
 
II – Naturalistic data and reactivity 
Many scientific enterprises have a phase or strand which focuses on description.  We 
cannot imagine contemporary evolutionary biology without Darwin’s voyage on the Beagle 
and his focus on small variations in the markings or structure within what were at the time 
considered to be distinct species.  Indeed, Darwin was struck by the strong role of 
conventions and familiarity on the production of descriptions and how naturalists were 
caught up by the expectation that they would find distinct species rather than the kinds of 
variation that came to be seen as evidence for evolution.   
In the case of social psychology, one might have expected that a major element in 
the scientific study of human social behaviour would be the generation of systematic 
observations of that social behaviour.  However, for the most part such observations remain 
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in the abortive field of ‘ecological psychology’ (Barker, 1968) or in work stimulated by the 
ethological study of animal behaviour (Byrne & Whiten, 1988).  It is striking that Manstead’s 
(2008) text goes back half a century to Robert Bales (1950) Interaction Process Analysis for 
an example of observational research in social psychology and it is equally striking that 
studies of social interaction have become increasingly rare in the main North American 
social psychology journals in the last 30 years.  One likely reason is the difficulty of 
reconciling the normative and voluntaristic organization of interaction with a factors and 
variables approach yoked to a cognitivist picture of human behaviour.  The phenomenon is 
fighting with the method and its theoretical underpinnings.  It is notable that where talk 
does appear in contemporary experimental work it is commonly seen as an independent 
variable (e.g. Pedersen and others, 2011, on rumination and Smith & Postmes, 2011, on talk 
and groups). 
One of the features of Discourse and Social Psychology was that it paved the way for 
a systematic use of records of actual human action in psychological research.  Instead of 
making targeted observations in an attempt to test theories the aim was more to generate 
sustained records of particular domains – family mealtimes, say – which could be used for 
hypothesis generation as well as analysis.  A feature of contemporary work as compared 
with the time of Barker or Bales is that the technology is in place for making high quality, 
audio and video records, on recorders that are cheap, non-intrusive, simple to use and easy 
to carry around.  They can be given to participants to make their own recordings.  Those 
records can be manipulated like paper transcript – edited, chopped into collections, digitally 
enhanced, posted, shared, and electronically anonimized.   
This recording and data management technology runs alongside a form of 
transcription originally developed by Gail Jefferson (2004) that was developed specifically to 
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capture social action.  Crucially, that form of transcription is designed to capture those 
features of interaction that are hearably relevant for the ongoing actions for the 
participants.  Work in conversation analysis over more than fifty years has highlighted the 
way that changes in pitch and speed, overlaps, emphasis and volume, combined with 
gesture, gaze, the use of aspiration and laughter particles, combined with different lexical 
selections and grammatical forms, are all potentially consequential for the unfolding 
conduct (Hepburn & Bolden, in press a,b).  As is common across the sciences, theory, 
method and descriptive categories have evolved in consort with one another (Hanson, 
1958).     
Note that although the order of potential relevance of these features of interaction 
can appear microscopic the actions that are thereby constituted need not be.  The standard 
orthographic representation of language in novels and plays simplifies and categorizes.  
However, the resources for building actions are much more finely calibrated than this 
suggests.  Analysis that loses these calibrations is not doing justice to the phenomena at 
hand: human action in its natural settings.  Note that the relevance of these features to 
participants’ conduct casts doubt on a range of uses of open ended interviews where 
research participants are expected to describe some social event or some version of 
conduct is generated in the form of a vignette in an experimental manipulation (Stokoe, 
2011).   
Sometimes social psychologists using experimental or interview techniques of data 
generation have complained that the collection of naturalistic material is subject to 
‘reactivity’ that contaminates the material, and they have used this as an argument for 
continuing with experimental or interview work.  The first thing to note here is that what 
reactivity there might be in discourse work is of a completely different order to the 
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constraints and manipulations of experiments or the flooding of social science categories 
into open ended interviews (Potter & Wetherell, 1995).  Second, a range of research has 
been conducted on public domain materials where there is no researcher reactivity possible 
(e.g., in work on police interviews, recorded as endogenous practices of police procedures, 
rather than for overhearing researchers e.g., Stokoe, 2009), and there is little evidence of 
systematic differences in the areas that discursive researchers are interested.  Third, letting 
participants record in their own settings means that there need not be the intrusive effect 
of the researcher’s presence and this can be combined with repeated recordings that gets 
all parties thoroughly acclimatized to the process of recording.  Jokes about being on 
television often appear in the first of a series of recordings, but rarely in the fifteenth.  
Fourth, it is possible to study those occasions where there is an orientation to the recording 
and consider the kinds of effects that it might have (Speer & Hutchby, 2003; Stokoe, 2009).  
Indeed, precisely because records of interaction as they happen are not a black box but are 
closely inspectable for what is going on the very issue of reactivity is available for study.  
This issue is one that generates more trouble from a classic cognitivist perspective where 
one is concerned events, objects and processes within individuals.  From an interactional 
perspective the focus is on organizations and practices through which the parties transact 
their lives with one another and these are highly resistant to faking, as studies comparing 
simulated and real interaction demonstrate (Stokoe, 2011a; b).   
 
III – Sampling and Generalization 
In classic experimental social psychology and a range of other social psychological 
work using surveys or questionnaires it is a requirement that samples are randomly selected 
from underlying populations.  This is intended to allow the statistical generalization from 
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sample to population.  Discourse and Social Psychology argued for a different way of 
considering sampling and generalization.  That picture can now be further refined.  First, 
there is an issue of what is being sampled.  In traditional work the key is typically the 
number of participants and whether they were representative or skewed in some way.  
Considerable effort is often expended in capturing specific populations – extrovert adult 
males, say.  In discourse work, particularly that which builds on conversation analysis the 
aim is often to identify a normative practice.   
For example, Bolden and Robinson (2011) worked through a range of different 
corpora of everyday conversation to identify examples where one speaker is called to 
account by another by way of a why interrogative.  They explicate a number of subtle 
dimensions of this practice which is regularly an element of criticisms and challenges.  Note 
that these researchers are not indifferent to questions of quantification.  They collected 311 
‘why-formatted’ interrogatives from 360 telephone recordings and 29 video recordings of 
naturally occurring English language interaction involving friends and family members.  One 
of the features of practices of this kind is that they are normative – that is, they are 
necessarily widely shared otherwise they simply would not work as practices.  Participants 
use the practice to call individuals to account, but the practice is not specific or idiosyncratic 
to those individuals.   
That does not mean that issues of variation across groups, classes and cultures are 
not relevant.  For example, Bolden and Robinson’s analysis of English language speakers can 
provide a template to compare say Japanese speakers against.  Maybe this practice is hard 
to find; maybe it is done differently, perhaps exploiting grammatical possibilities of 
Japanese; maybe it appears in two different forms.  The core analysis provides a resource 
for further analysis in a stepwise manner.  Moreover, we can ask whether this practice is 
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exploited and perhaps refined in courtrooms or police interrogations (see, for example, 
Edwards, 2008, on police exploitation of mundane notions of intention in interrogations).   
 
THEORY 
 
It is perhaps not surprising that a work that brought the study of discourse to the 
fore might be treated as limited in what it can say about people.  Over the last 25 years the 
idea that discourse work sustains an image of ‘blank subjectivity’ and fails to address 
embodiment has become common and that something else is required to get at the subtlety 
and ‘interiority’ of experience (from numerous possible examples, see e.g. Brown, et al., 
2011; Parker,1997; Willig, 2001, and papers in Nightingale & Cromby, 1999).  Recently 
psychosocial approaches, often drawing on Lacan, and different kinds of phenomenological 
approaches have come to fore (e.g. Frosh & Saville Young, 2008).   
 
I – Experience, cognition and the ‘blank subjectivity’ critique 
One thing that distinguishes the conversation analytic influenced strand of discursive 
psychology from experimental work, on the one hand, and approaches based on qualitative 
interviews such as the ‘free association narrative method’ or ‘interpretative 
phenomenological analysis’ (Hollway & Jefferson, 2005; Smith & Osborne, 2008) is that it 
puts participants own orientations at the heart of its analysis.  These are the live 
orientations that are practical parts of conduct unfolding in real time.  This is a completely 
different order of phenomena than the post-hoc constructions and formulations that 
appear in qualitative interviews.  Those are a major focus for discourse work on the 
organization of repertoires, commonplaces and constructions that are parts of new actions 
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– and they can be exploited when the research attends carefully to their role in practices in 
the interviews themselves (e.g. in Condor,  2006; Tileagă, 2010.    
The focus on orientations in real time in natural interaction makes ‘psychological’ 
matters inescapable; such matters are an essential resource for participants as they 
coordinate their actions,respond to expressions of liking and dislike, say, or as they manage 
incipient actions such as invitations or requests.  The world of discourse is psychologically 
imbued in precisely the way real life is imbued.  The organization of discourse with its lexical 
items, categories, grammatical organizations and plethora of different practices is highly 
normative.  Moreover, it unfolds in real time with an extraordinary granularity in which 
delays of less than a fifth of a second, or minor changes in pitch contour, can mark a 
‘psychological state’ (Drew, 2005; Heritage, 2005).  The point, of course, as Wittgenstein 
argued so eloquently is that psychological business is necessarily hearable/visible otherwise 
participants would not be able to coordinate with one another effectively (Wittgenstein, 
1953: #329;  Coulter, 2008).  The delicacy of this real time working of interaction is 
particularly difficult to capture experimentally (see Schegloff, 2004, 2006, on the 
insufficiency of cognitive models of dialogue), and it is a probably impossible challenge for 
qualitative interview based approaches. 
As conversation analysis has effectively demonstrated in a cumulative empirical 
programme for more than fifty years, turn organization supplies a key resource for 
understanding other people; indeed, Schegloff has suggested that it is a major resource for 
sustaining intersubjectivity and the practices of conversational repair can be seen as ways of 
(re)accomplishing intersubjectivity when it is under threat (Schegloff, 1992).  More recently, 
classical psychological problems of shared knowledge – who knows what and how is 
knowledge shared – have been tackled in subtle ways (see papers in Stivers, Mondada & 
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Steensig, 2011).  Psychological matters are here studied in their home environment of live 
unconstrained interaction where the parties have a genuine and practical stake in outcomes 
(Edwards, 2006).   
Far from blank subjectivity, then, the subjectivity that is live for participants is one 
that is voiced, expressed, sequentially organized.  It is as rich as the lexical, intonational, and 
sequential resources of interaction can allow.  This is one of the reasons for emphasising the 
virtues of both naturalistic materials and the careful transcription of interaction that can 
capture this linguistic theatre of the self (see Potter & Hepburn, 2005a,b and responses 
from Hollway,  Smith, and Mischler).   As Billig (1999) argued, there is something 
problematic about those with a psychodynamic interest, for example, looking for hidden 
motives behind discourse and simultaneously failing to look carefully at what is actually 
there.  Given participants treat prosody, delay, laughter and other features of delivery as 
crucial in their treatment of the psychological states of others, it is odd for social 
psychologists to argue that they do no need to take such things seriously in their materials 
(e.g. Hollway, 2005; Smith, 2005).  Again, this emphasises how vital it is for social 
psychologists to systematically study the machinery that generates their findings.  If 
researchers interview people about their experience then what is the status of this 
interview talk?  Given that much ‘cognitive’ language is orientated to action, how will those 
actions be suppressed for mere description when talking to a social researcher?  These are 
generic issues that were highlighted in Discourse and Social Psychology in its discussion a 
range of social psychological methods; but they are exaggerated with qualitative research 
interviews about ‘experience’ (Potter, in press).  
 
II Feeling and emotion 
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Emotion was hardly mentioned in Discourse and Social Psychology.  At that time 
emotion had typically been constructed as associated with physiology and something having 
a causal and often distorting effect on cognition.  Critics of discourse work have not been 
slow to flag emotion as a topic of study beyond the mere analysis of talk and text.  Since the 
1980s, however, discourse researchers have started to address emotion, although that, in 
turn, has involved considerable caution about the category ‘emotion’ itself.  As Edwards 
argues, emotions are shifting and complex notions which different boundaries and contrasts 
within different cultures and settings:   
Emotions are not only contrasted with cognitions (whether rational or not), both in ‘folk’ and in 
professional psychology, but there are also cognitive theories of emotions, and indeed 
cognitive models that virtually do away with, or explain away, emotion categories altogether. 
But there are also emotion-based explanations of cognition, of what people think, what they 
think about, and why they think one thing rather than another (because of envy, jealousy, 
prejudice, obsession, etc.) (1999, pp. **). 
Indeed, a common limitation of classic psychological work on emotions was to presuppose 
emotion categories of common English language groups and compare other cultures with 
that template (Edwards, 1997).  This has become the basis for research on (a) the use of 
‘emotion’ categories; (b) orientations to objects and actions as ‘emotional’ and (c) displays 
and receipts of ‘emotion’ (Edwards, 2007).   
The original theoretical reformulations of Discourse and Social Psychology have led 
to work moving in very different directions.  On the one hand, the kinds of painstaking 
descriptive study of the way crying and upset are displayed in talk has highlighted the 
extraordinary delicate orientations of participants to possible trouble.  Hepburn (2004) 
showed that call takers on a child protection helpline were able to use small fragments of 
tremulous delivery, combined with placing in topic talk, and small changes in the timing of 
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delivery, to diagnose distress.  On the other hand, there is a ‘wilder’ body of work 
stimulated by the  so called turn to affect.  Wetherell has developed a notion of affective 
practice that: 
focuses on the emotional as it appears in social life and tries to follow what participants do. It 
finds shifting, flexible and often over-determined figurations rather than simple lines of 
causation, character types, and neat emotion categories (2012, pp **). 
In both cases it is possible to see discourse based work generating novel and analytically 
grounded studies in the domain of emotion, capturing the piquancy of the psychologically 
charged moment or painting in the sweep of ideological argument. 
 
III A matrix of social psychological issues 
In this brief final section I will make some observations about the domain of social 
psychology.  Some responses to Discourse and Social Psychology and the traditions of work 
that it generated suggested that it was interesting and yet more relevant in another 
discipline – linguistics or sociology, say, or even literary criticism.  We can now see that far 
from having an only oblique relation to social psychology discourse work can claim to have 
made a profound contribution and has played a role in redefining the discipline.  The work 
of Martha Augoustinos, Michael Billig, Margaret Wetherell and others on ideological 
matters and the way social organizations are legitimated and intergroup differences are 
disguised is now well established (see papers in Potter, 2007).  Let me end by sketching the 
way more recent work offers a novel approach to social psychological matters.   
Key here is the way discourse work and in particular recent discursive psychology 
deals with direct records of actual people interacting with one another in real time, and its 
analysis situates that interaction within the social, physical and institutional contexts of 
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what is going on as these things become live and relevant in the interaction.  It would be 
hard to argue against this being a core, maybe even foundational, domain for a distinctively 
social psychology.   
Take the traditional social psychological field of social influence.  Typical social 
influence work considered the operation of variables such as credibility, status and 
information on the behaviour of individuals.  Discourse work has taken a rather different 
path that has considered concrete situations where something that might be seen as 
influence takes place; that is, where individuals attempt to change the behaviour of other 
individuals.   Some form of influence is part of a range of practices that can be described 
using vernacular action descriptions such as requests, offers, admonishments, threats, 
complaints and advice.  Studies of such practices have identified a range of often shared 
considerations that cut across the different practices.  
Curl and Drew (2008) studied requests in environments such as afterhours medical 
services or call centres that manage non-emergency calls to the police.  Requests are actions 
where one party is modifying the behaviour of another.  They noted that requests are build 
differently according (a) to the displayed entitlement of the request issuer to receive what 
the request demands and (b) to the contingencies the request recipient faces in delivering 
what is requested.  Request forms thus become more presumptuous when the person 
requesting claims high entitlement and treats the recipient as likely to be able to comply 
with the request (low contingency).  Thus ‘I was wondering if…’ prefaced requests display 
less entitlement than ‘could you…’ prefaced requests.   
Craven and Potter (2010) extended this analysis to consider the nature of actions 
where one party directly directs the behaviour of another, using material from family 
mealtimes.  A feature of these was that they did not use ‘I was wondering if…’ prefaces 
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(which we might see in a call to an out of hours surgery where the caller is showing low 
entitlement to a home visit and orienting to the contingency of the doctor being able to 
perform such a visit).  Neither did they use the kinds of constructions typical of requests 
that orient to the wants or abilities of the recipient – ‘do you want to come to dinner’, 
‘could you come over on Saturday’.  Rather directives embodied no orientation to the 
recipients’ desires or capacities: ‘put that down’, ‘hold that with two hands’.  There is also a 
subtle shift in the appropriate next action for a directive.  While for a request the 
appropriate next action is acceptance for a directive it is compliance.   
Now contrast both requests and directives with advice.  Here again one party is 
managing the behaviour of another.  Heritage and Sefi (1992) noted that advice is normative 
– it is offering a course of action that should be followed.  As a social institution advice 
builds a stance of disinterest, in contrast to requests which orient to the needs or 
requirements of the person who has issued the request.  Advice is also epistemically 
asymmetric - the advice giver builds themselves as more knowledgeable than the advice 
recipient.  This asymmetry can be worked with in various institutional situations.  For 
example, Butler and colleagues (2010) studied the way advice on a child support line was 
regularly delivered using interrogative grammar  – ‘have you thought about talking to a 
teacher’.  Such constructions manage the asymmetry.  The counsellor builds a picture of the 
caller’s situation, but also provides a softened indication of appropriate action.  This 
highlights a relevant and possibly appropriate action yet allows the child to follow the advice 
or not by fitting it to her or his particular circumstances.   In contrast, Hepburn and Potter 
(2011b) consider situations on a child protection helpline where advice is being resisted.  
Callers may use the detailed knowledge of their situation to resist the advice while the Call 
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Takers can use generic social work knowledge or broader idioms and commonplaces – ‘your 
child’s health has got to come first’; ‘grown ups have got to be grown up’.   
What we see then is that these actions, all of which involve some kind of behaviour 
modification or social influence, orient to a set of core dimensions, notably entitlement, 
contingency, relative knowledge and the interests of the parties.  All of these are live, 
oriented to, and relevant at different points as the practices unfold.  The lexical and 
grammatical resources of a language, the different possibilities for delivery, and the physical 
affordances of the environment are used to build the specific action with specific 
implications for the recipient.  Crucially, they are not factors that exert a simple causal 
influence; they are dimensions that participants orient to as they build their activities and 
respond to activities of others.  This, this is the start of a possible matrix for understanding 
core issues in a social psychology that is built up from observation of ‘everyday lives, as they 
happen’ (Stokoe, 2011b). 
  
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has used the opportunity provided by the BJSP special issue to consider 
some of the themes as they have emerged in the last quarter century.  In particular, it has 
focused on a range of critical points raised by both experimental and qualitative social 
psychologists of various traditions and providing a contemporary response.  This has 
focused in particular on a range of misunderstandings and confusions about the scientific 
basis of discourse work, the nature of observation, and the possibility of a systematic 
analysis of voluntary behaviour.  Its methodological discussion considers the role of 
qualitative interviews, the importance of working with naturalistic records, the way in which 
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reactivity can be managed, and how sampling and generalization can work in this tradition.  
Finally, it considers how new insights into the classic psychological topics of experience and 
emotion can be generated, and ended with a sketch of a matrix of dimensions that are 
fundamental for building actions of social influence such as requests and advice.  The point 
is to trace the way that Discourse and Social Psychology has been a platform for a scientific, 
rigorous, naturalistic social psychology.  That naturalistic social psychology is now well under 
way. 
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